The Gospel of Calculation: South Korea’s Religious Far-Right and the Negative Form of Calculated Nationalism
Gil Soo Han / Monash University

Figure 1. Hong “Bone-chilling” exposes Shincheonji’s primary intervention.

The contemporary contours of South Korean nationalism are currently undergoing a profound transformation, characterized by the emergence of what may be termed “calculated nationalism.” This phenomenon, also deeply embedded within specific sectors of Korean Protestantism, represents a volatile intersection where sacred symbols are instrumentalized to serve profane interests. At the centre of this transition is the theorization of “calculated nationalism”,[¹] which provides a critical framework for understanding how grassroots agency in Korea has shifted from sacrificial loyalty to the state toward a transactional relationship based on institutional and personal gain. While my account of calculated nationalism is primarily an analytical tool that does not inherently lean toward a positive or negative assessment, this article demonstrates how a corrosive variant of this logic has taken hold within the religious far-right, prioritizing vested interests over the welfare of the nation-state.[²]

Theoretical Foundations and Historical Context

Historically, South Korean nationalism was viewed through an ethno-nationalist lens, often described as gukga or “country-family,” emphasizing homogeneity and a top-down mobilization engineered by elites for state goals like rapid industrialization. However, modernization through “compressed development” produced a more complex “bottom-up” variant. Unlike previous movements that emphasized individual sacrifice for the nation, the “calculated” grassroots agency of the 21st century is overtly concerned with what citizens can receive from a democratic and economically affluent nation-state. This logic fueled the constructive change of the 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution, yet it also provided a blueprint for religious organizations to pursue their own political and economic “calculations.”[³]

Figure 2. Pastor Jeon Kwang-Hoon attends a service

To understand this shift within the church, one must look at the historical precarity of Korean Protestantism. Since the end of the Korean War, the church has functioned as a conservative, anti-communist bastion, blindly opposed to the North Korean regime and China while tending toward pro-American and pro-Japanese geopolitical stances.[⁴] This ideological alignment has left many churches vulnerable to a “nostalgic nationalism” represented by the “Flag-Carriers” (Taegeukgi protesters)—predominantly senior citizens who lived through the era of Park Chung-Hee and view democratization as a threat to the nation’s traditional order.[⁵] Conservative elites and religious leaders have skilfully mobilized this demographic by reinforcing their threat perception, portraying them as a marginalized “industrialization generation” fighting to rescue a nation at risk of being “communized”.[⁶]  

Figure 3. Members of conservative civic groups take part in an anti-government protest

The Far-Right Vanguard: Jeon Kwang-Hoon and Shincheonji

The abstract framework of negative calculated nationalism finds its most concrete manifestation in the activities of figures like Pastor Jeon Kwang-Hoon and movements like the Shincheonji Church of Jesus. These actors have successfully leveraged their congregational power to influence the state in pursuit of their institutional preservation. Pastor Jeon, leader of the Sarang Jeil Church, rose to prominence by framing political conflict as a Manichean struggle between the “holy” past and a “pro-communist” future. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he organized mass anti-government rallies, dismissing health mandates as a “government plot” to purposefully spread the virus to religious communities to silence political dissent.[⁷]

Figure 4. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol and his wife, Kim Keon-Hee, arriving at Seoul Air Base

By 2025, investigations revealed that Jeon played a central role in justifying President Yoon Suk-Yeol’s attempted “self-coup” and the subsequent declaration of martial law in December 2024. Framing Yoon as “God-sent,” Jeon incited mobs and encouraged his congregants to storm and ransack courts in early 2025 to protect a leader who aligned with the church’s conservative interests. This direct intervention in state affairs—where a religious leader provides the ideological “rescue” rhetoric for an assault on democratic institutions—represents the ultimate convergence of negative calculation and divisive politics.[⁸]

While Jeon operates through overt confrontation, Shincheonji has utilized a more covert form of calculation. Allegations surfaced that the group directed over 100,000 members to join the People Power Party (PPP) as “responsible members” during the 2021 presidential primary to ensure Yoon Suk-Yeol’s nomination.[⁹] This mass enrolment was reportedly a strategic move to secure patronage from a candidate who, as Prosecutor General, had reportedly been advised by spiritual figures to avoid raiding the group’s headquarters during earlier health investigations. In return for electoral support, the group allegedly sought hidden positions of power and state aid for development projects. This alliance was further bolstered by the “Idaenam” (men in their 20s), a demographic conservative politicians attracted through “gender wars” and anti-feminist rhetoric, framing traditional family values as a matter of national security.[¹⁰]

The Secularization of Faith: Christ vs. Culture

The theological root of this crisis is a profound imbalance between “Christ” (religious mission) and “culture” (secular pursuits).[¹¹] Many Korean megachurches have adopted the organizational logic of chaebols (conglomerates), focusing on quantitative growth as a “non-negotiable goal”. In this competitive neoliberal context, the church often functions more as a “business of faith” than a spiritual community. Head ministers often act as “religious dictators,” utilizing traditional Confucian values of blind respect for hierarchy to monopolize the pulpit and direct resources toward “profane gains.”[¹²]

The most visible manifestation of this negative calculation is hereditary succession. Ministers increasingly treat their churches as “private property” to be passed on to relatives, driven by a greed for money, honour, and power. This practice is a form of modern-day simony, in which the church’s spiritual legacy is traded for the financial security of the minister’s family. The church displays a profound “double standard,” claiming these successions are the “will of God” while they are clearly motivated by the pursuit of secular assets in an insecure economy. Ironically, while these leaders argue that Christians must be united for the sake of “rescuing” the nation-state from communism, their own self-interested calculations serve as the primary catalyst for national division. By losing the balance between “Christ” and “culture,” these organizations have lost their ability to promote the higher values of the nation, such as solidarity and justice.[¹²]

Figure 5. Kim Byeong-Gi, Acting Representative and the Floor Leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, speaks at the Supreme Council meeting. /Courtesy of News1

Concluding Remarks

The “gospel of calculation” in Korean Protestantism reveals a dark side to the grassroots agency that has otherwise fuelled Korea’s democratization. When nationalism is calculated purely through the lens of institutional vested interests, it ceases to be a constructive force and becomes a tool for exclusionary and divisive politics. Theoretical analysis of these findings shows that the religious far-right’s support for standpattist political parties is not born of biblical teaching but of a transactional desire for state patronage and the protection of private wealth.

Figure 6. Full video of the Constitutional Court’s ruling to dismiss Yoon, April 4, 2025.

To overcome this malaise, the Korean church must move beyond the growth-oriented theories that have mired it in scandal and division. A transition toward “missional ecclesiology”—a paradigm focusing on grassroots unity, holistic mission, and the church’s relationship to the world rather than its own internal expansion—is essential. Only by restoring the balance between spiritual integrity and secular action can the church fulfill its duty to the nation-state. Resisting the negative form of calculation is not just a religious imperative; it is a prerequisite for the survival of South Korean democracy in the 21st century.[¹³]

Image Credits:

1. Hong “Bone-chilling” exposes Shincheonji’s primary intervention
2. Pastor Jeon Kwang-Hoon attends a service
3. Members of conservative civic groups take part in an anti-government protest
4. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol and his wife, Kim Keon-Hee, arriving at Seoul Air Base
5. Kim Byeong-Gi, Acting Representative and the Floor Leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, speaks at the Supreme Council meeting
6. Full video of the Constitutional Court’s ruling to dismiss Yoon

References:

1. Han, Gil-Soo. 2023. Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea: Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. [↩]
2. Ibid; Han, Gil-Soo. 2024. “Shifting from top-down to bottom-up nationalism: an analysis of YouTube speeches from the 2016/17 candlelight revolution in South Korea.” Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 38 (5): 724–739. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/10304312.2024.2414788. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10304312.2024.2414788#abstract. [↩]
3. Han, Gil-Soo. 2023. Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea: Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; Han, Gil-Soo. 2024. “Shifting from top-down to bottom-up nationalism: an analysis of YouTube speeches from the 2016/17 candlelight revolution in South Korea.” Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 38 (5): 724–739. [↩]
4. MBC News. 2025. “洪 ‘모골이 송연’ ‘신천지 경선개입’ 폭로…권성동 ‘홍준표식 만성질환’ 반박…’통일교’ 커넥션 의혹은?” (Hong ‘Bone-chilling’ exposes Shincheonji’s primary intervention… Kwon Seong-dong refutes ‘Hong Joon-Pyo-style chronic illness’… Suspicions of Unification Church connections?) – [Hot Issue PLAY]. July 27, accessed January 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXswiM9_pas. [↩]
5. KBS News. 2025. “은박 담요 쓰고 “탄핵 반대”…전광훈 목사 예배도” (Wearing a silver blanket, they protested against impeachment at Pastor Jeon Kwang-Hoon’s service.), January 5, accessed January 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kapeKjG1480. [↩]
6. Han, Gil-Soo, and David Hundt. 2021. “Nostalgic Nationalists in South Korea: The Flag-Carriers’ Struggles.” Critical Asian Studies 53 (3): 412–431; Han, Gil-Soo. 2023. Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea: Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. [↩]
7. Voice of America. 2020. “A Renegade South Korean Church Sparks Outbreak.” August 19, accessed January 5, 2026, https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-church-covid-outbreak/6742547.html; Im, Hyug Baeg. 2020. Democratization and Democracy in South Korea, 1960–Present [1st ed.]. Documen PUB, accessed January 5, 2026, https://dokumen.pub/democratization-and-democracy-in-south-korea-1960present-1st-ed-9789811537028-9789811537035.html. [↩]
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9. MBC News. 2025. “洪 ‘모골이 송연’ ‘신천지 경선개입’ 폭로…권성동 ‘홍준표식 만성질환’ 반박…’통일교’ 커넥션 의혹은?” (Hong ‘Bone-chilling’ exposes Shincheonji’s primary intervention… Kwon Seong-dong refutes ‘Hong Joon-Pyo-style chronic illness’… Suspicions of Unification Church connections?) – [Hot Issue PLAY]. July 27, accessed January 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXswiM9_pas; SBS News: “”호소형 계엄? 인정 안돼” 헌재 ‘윤 파면 선고’ 풀영상” (Constitutional Court Ruling on Presidential Impeachment and the Martial Law Crisis). April 4, accessed January 5, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cyt6dPilj7Y. [↩]
10. Lee, Eunwoo. 2025. “South Korea’s Special Counsels Delve Into the Supernatural Side of Yoon’s Presidency.” The Diplomat, August 8, accessed January 5, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/south-koreas-special-counsels-delve-into-the-supernatural-side-of-yoons-presidency/; Park, Suk-Hyeon. 2025. “Kim Byeong-ki vows action over allegations of Shincheonji intervention in election.” July 28, accessed January 5, 2026, https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-policy/2025/07/28/GPYJTERNBRBDHHJ3LBNLIPJJHI/. [↩]
11. Niebuhr, Richard. 1951. Christ and Culture. New York: Harper & Row. [↩]
12. Han, Gil-Soo. 2025. “‘The Church that Laid the Golden Eggs’: Catalysts for Hereditary Succession in South Korea’s Protestant Church.” Asian Studies Review: 1–19. [↩] [↩]
13. Kim, Choong Soon. 2011. Voices of Foreign Brides: The Roots and Development of Multiculturalism in Korea. Lanham: AltaMira Press; Han, Kang-Hee. 2025. “Shifting Disunity to Unity: Missional Ecclesiology and Grassroots Ecumenism in Korean Protestantism.” Madang: Journal of Contextual Theology 43: 5–21. https://www.minjung.or.kr/43-2/. [↩]